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Angular scale expansion theory and the misperception of
egocentric distance in locomotor space
Frank H. Durgin
Swarthmore College

Abstract

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Perception is crucial for the control of action, but perception need not be scaled accurately to
produce accurate actions. This paper reviews evidence for an elegant new theory of locomotor
space perception that is based on the dense coding of angular declination so that action control
may be guided by richer feedback. The theory accounts for why so much direct-estimation data
suggests that egocentric distance is underestimated despite the fact that action measures have been
interpreted as indicating accurate perception. Actions are calibrated to the perceived scale of space
and thus action measures are typically unable to distinguish systematic (e.g., linearly scaled)
misperception from accurate perception. Whereas subjective reports of the scaling of linear extent
are difficult to evaluate in absolute terms, study of the scaling of perceived angles (which exist in
a known scale, delimited by vertical and horizontal) provides new evidence regarding the
perceptual scaling of locomotor space.
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Do things in locomotor space seem closer than they are? Proposals about the nature of
perceived egocentric distance have a long history, with many different kinds of experimental
tasks producing different interpretations ranging from the idea that visual space perception is
quite accurately scaled to the idea that it can’t even be expressed in Euclidean terms.
Recently a functional account of distance underestimation has been proposed in conjunction
with a more general treatment of the perception of locomotor space (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li
& Durgin, 2010, 2012). This new account integrates several kinds of evidence including
direct numeric reports of perceptual experience, perceptual matching tasks and action
measures, such as walking and pointing while walking. This new account proposes that the
underestimation of space is a functional consequence of an efficient coding scheme
concerned with the precise representation of angular variables that are useful for the control
of action.
This paper provides a review of this theory in four sections. In the first section matching and
estimation evidence is reviewed that suggests that egocentric distances along the ground
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seem shorter than they are whereas action measures suggest accurate egocentric distance
perception. In this section it is argued that because there is no natural scale for distance that
allows us to measure subjective experience directly, the existing evidence only establishes
that the three directions (horizontal distance in depth along the ground plane, horizontal
frontal extents on the ground plane, and vertical extents protruding out of the ground plane)
seem to be perceived on different scales (no matter which type of measure is used). In the
second section, evidence concerning errors in perceived angular direction is used to argue
that we can indeed conclude that the geometry of space is distorted in specific ways given
that angular scales ranging from horizontal to vertical provide a basis for mapping subjective
experience. A third section explains why systematic perceptual biases in egocentric distance
perception cannot be evident in action measures. Finally, the fourth section presents a
discussion of the possible functional utility of the sort of distortion observed in angular
variables. In brief, the argument will be that denser coding of directions near to straight
ahead may underlie the perceptual biases observed. The denser coding provides more useful
information (i.e., more sensitive perceptual feedback) for guiding action.

Do things seem closer than they are?
NIH-PA Author Manuscript

When asked to estimate distance using standard units like feet or meters, people tend to
underestimate (Foley, Ribeiro-Filho & Da Silva 2004; Kelly, Loomis & Beall, 2004). The
interpretation of these kinds of observations as suggesting the things seem closer than they
are has sometimes been challenged on the grounds that underestimation may simply reflect a
failure of verbal calibration. Indeed, success of verbal calibration for far distances has been
demonstrated in athletes based on their awareness of standard field extents (Durgin,
Leonard-Solis, Masters, Schmelz & Li, 2012), but why is underestimation the norm? The
measurement of perceptual experience, being inherently dependent on either verbal report or
other behaviors, is no trivial task, and there have been conflicts over how best to quantify
perceptual experience.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Gilinsky (1951) argued that perceived distance was hyperbolic. She found that ground
extents needed to be larger and larger as they got farther away to appear equal. Her data
implied that a hyperbolic function with an asymptote of about 28 m described egocentric
distance perception. Although this pattern has been replicated using the same methods (Ooi
& He, 2007), it is not widely regarded as a definitive way to evaluate perceived egocentric
distance. For one thing, Gilinsky’s constant appears to depend on observer eye-height
(Loomis & Philbeck, 1999; Ooi & He, 2007). Moreover, when asked to indicate the
bisection point for very large egocentric distances, Gilinsky’s theory implies people should
set the bisection point much too close, but Purdy and Gibson (1955) reported that distance
bisection in locomotor space was impressively accurate. Nonetheless, one aspect of
Gilinsky’s theory that is worth emphasizing is that it provides a model of how a physical
dimension which is potentially unbounded (egocentric distance, construed abstractly) could
be represented by a finite coding scheme in the brain.
Loomis, Da Silva, Fujita and Fukushima (1992) argued that the evaluation of exocentric
distances showed compression that was not evident in the evaluation of egocentric distances.
That is, when asked to compare frontal intervals and exocentric intervals in depth, the
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exocentric depth intervals appeared compressed, and had to be much larger than the frontal
intervals to appear equal. But when asked to walk blindfolded to previewed targets,
participants were unbiased in their walking for distances of up to 20 m away. Based on the
linearity of the walking responses, the data of Loomis et al. help to reject a hyperbolic model
of egocentric distance perception, and several studies suggest that the biased evaluation of
exocentric ground extents in depth (such as studied by Gilinsky, 1951) may be better
understood in terms of the misperception of shape via optical slant (Li & Durgin, 2010,
2012, 2013; Loomis & Philbeck, 1999; Loomis, Philbeck & Zahorik, 2002).
Studies of distance perception that have fit power functions to egocentric distance estimates
typically find an exponent very near to 1.0 (e.g., Da Silva, 1985; Teghtsoonian &
Teghtsoonian, 1970). This suggests that the perception of distance is linear. But the question
of whether distance perception is accurate or approximates linear compression is not easy to
address. Loomis and Philbeck (2008) have argued that pointing remains accurate, but that
verbal estimates of distance to a target made before and after walking obliquely past the
target are inconsistent with Euclidean geometry of triangulation, as shown in Figure 1A.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

However, the analysis of Loomis and Philbeck (2008) depends on the assumption that the
walker has an accurate perception of the distance walked. The discrepancy between the
verbal estimates and the walking responses could be interpreted another way. That is, on the
one hand, the discrepancy between walking and estimating may signal that people perceived
the distance accurately, but are poorly calibrated in their verbal estimates of distance. On the
other hand, it might be that people really do underperceive the visual distance, and therefore
also underperceive the distance of their walking as illustrated in Figure 1B.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Walking performance is calibrated by walking around in the perceived world, it would seem
quite reasonable that people who perceive a visual distance of 10 m as 7 m would also
perceive walking 10 m as walking 7 m. There is nothing in the motor experience of walked
distance to calibrate it except perceptual experience. That is, internal to the motor system,
the units of walked distance might be expressed in terms of steps taken, normalized by the
frequency of steps, which is correlated, for each walker, with step length (Durgin, Akagi,
Gallistel & Haiken, 2008; Durgin, Reed & Tigue, 2007). If the units of motor control are not
visual units, they must nonetheless be calibrated to visual units during everyday walking in
order for predictive action to be successful. Thus, it is easy to imagine that when people
walk 10 m, they experience the distance travelled as only 7 m of visual units of distance.
Indeed, when asked, verbally, to walk “7 m”, without visual feedback, people walk out 10 m
(Riemer, Hölzl & Kleinböhl, 2014). This means that the perceptual experience of
participants who appear to be failing at triangulation (Figure 1A) is actually consistent with
triangulation if we simply replace the actual distance walked by the perceived distance
walked, as represented in Figure 1B.
If verbal underestimation were the only source of evidence available, it is not obvious that
scientists should find the above analysis compelling. But other methods of evaluating
perceived egocentric distance also suggest that egocentric distance is compressed. For
example, if one adapts the exocentric aspect ratio task used by Loomis et al. (1992), but with
one leg as an egocentric distance and the other leg as an exocentric frontal extent, perceptual
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matching makes clear that the egocentric distance must be made greater than the frontal
extent to appear equal to it (Li, Phillips & Durgin, 2011). Whether asked to adjust their
egocentric distance in order to match a frontal interval or asked to adjust the frontal interval
to match their egocentric distance from it, participants reliably create a configuration in
which the egocentric distance is much larger than the frontal extent. Similarly, when asked
to match their egocentric distance to a vertical frontal extent, they set themselves much too
far away (Higashiyama, 1996; Higashiyama & Ueyama, 1988; Li et al., 2011; see Figure 3,
below). The magnitude of the error with vertical extents is larger than the error with
horizontal frontal extents, which is consistent with the observation that the VerticalHorizontal illusion is quite large for large-scale objects (Chapanis & Mankin, 1967; Yang,
Dixon & Proffitt, 1999). What seems to be clear from these observations is that egocentric
distances are compressed perceptually compared to both horizontal frontal extents and to
vertical frontal extents. Moreover, when asked to walk out the distance of a frontal interval,
blind walking measures overestimate the distance, consistent with the calibration idea above.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Of course, it could still be the case that both vertical and horizontal extents are actually
exaggerated in perception, and that the egocentric extents are the only ones represented
accurately. That is, even if we are convinced that the scaling of the linear dimensions of
width, height and depth differs, how are we to determine which one is “correct”?

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Magnitude estimation might underestimate egocentric distance simply because most people
are more familiar with units of height than of egocentric distance. For example, in a study of
verbal calibration it was recently reported that estimates of height were fairly accurate for
poles that were four or six times the height of a person. The strategy reported by most
participants was to estimate the pole relative to a person’s height (Durgin et al., 2012). The
most common extents that people may know in standard units are their own height. Given
that height and depth seem to be differently scaled in perception, it could easily be that
people are reporting egocentric distances in terms of the verbal height scale that they are
most familiar with, and thus that verbal underestimation of ground extents is a result of the
prevalent calibration of verbal reports of standard units to vertical extents (the heights of
persons). In other words, even though there is consistent underestimation of perceived
distance in verbal units, it is fairly easy to see how this may simply be a consequence of the
differential scaling of height and distance. Thus, we seem to be able to draw conclusions
about relative scaling (using both perceptual matching tasks and estimation tasks), and
similar conclusions are even supported by walking actions (Li et al., 2013); but none of
these data provide a firm basis for determining the absolute scaling of egocentric extents.

Systematic bias in perceived gaze declination is consistent with egocentric
distance underestimation
Whereas there seems to be a clear “unit” problem for measures of linear extent (what do
people mean by a “foot” or a “meter”?), the situation is somewhat different for angular
measures. The scale for distance is bounded only at one end (zero), so the unit scaling of
distance is inherently ambiguous, but the doubly-bounded range of angles between
horizontal and vertical means that angular scales can be representationally unambiguously.
If the angular distance between vertical and horizontal is specified as 90°, then it is clear
Psychol Neurosci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 November 25.
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where 45° is, 30°, 15°, etc. This unambiguous unit scaling is useful for evaluating the
accuracy of space perception: In fact estimates of some angular variables relevant to the
perception of locomotor space are systematically biased (Durgin & Li, 2011a; Li & Durgin,
2009).
In a study of the perception of downhill slant, Li and Durgin (2009) discovered that people
show large errors in their proprioception of head tilt (fore and aft) and in the perceived
direction of their gaze relative to horizontal. This contributes to the overestimation of
downhill slant, but it is also relevant to the perception of visual distance because the angle of
gaze declination below the horizontal (γ, see Figure 2) is a powerful distance cue (e.g.,
Messing & Durgin, 2005; Ooi, Wu & He, 2001; Wallach & O’Leary, 1982), and Durgin and
Li (2011a) pointed out that the errors in perceived gaze declination were consistent with the
underestimation of distance that is commonly reported, as shown in Figure 2. Durgin and Li
provided several assessments of perceived gaze declination, all of which indicated a
perceptual gain of about 1.5, such that participants judged a declination of 20°, for example,
to be 30°.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript
NIH-PA Author Manuscript

These errors in angular perception are not simply verbal calibration errors. When asked to
estimate the slants of surfaces (3D orientation) or the tilts of lines (2D orientation), people
show systematic biases in their estimates, but there are several types of evidence showing
that these biases are not verbal biases. First, the biases are different for judgments of 3D
orientation and of 2D orientation (Durgin & Li, 2012). More importantly, the biases are
spatial rather than numeric: If asked to estimate the orientation of a line relative to vertical,
numeric estimates will consistently underestimate the orientation in degrees. If asked to
estimate the orientation of a line relative to horizontal, numeric estimates will consistently
overestimate the orientation in degrees. Both of these responses are consistent with the
spatial overestimation of orientation relative to horizontal. This same general pattern is true
for surface orientation. In general, the use of numeric estimates of angles seems to be wellbehaved for measuring perceived spatial biases (Durgin & Li, 2011b; Durgin, Li & Hajnal,
2010). Moreover, if participants are asked to indicate whether a slanted surface (or a tilted
line) is closer to vertical or to horizontal in order to estimate the perceived bisection point,
the data demonstrate a pattern just like the numeric estimate of 45°. That is, for 3D surface
slant, the bisection point is about 34° from horizontal (Durgin et al., 2010). For 2D line
orientation, the apparent bisection point is about 37° from horizontal (Durgin & Li, 2011b).
Durgin and Li (2011a) used three methods to assess bias in the perceived direction of gaze.
One method (also used by Li & Durgin, 2009) was to have participants explicitly estimate
the angular direction (relative to horizontal) to real or virtual objects. Durgin and Li (2009)
had people estimate the direction of their gaze when looking at specific objects from second
story windows. Durgin and Li (2011a) conducted a more extensive experiment using golf
balls placed at different locations on a slanted field (the slant of the field was intended to
discourage people from trying to use ground distance to deduce the angle). Durgin and Li
also had participants make similar judgments for balls presented in a virtual environment
with only a ground plane (and horizon) visible. In each case, estimates of gaze declination in
the tested range (0–50° relative to horizontal) were best fit by functions with a slope of 1.5.
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A second, more indirect, method for estimating perceived gaze direction (or angular
declination) is to have participants make geographical slant judgments when looking at
surfaces presented along different gaze declinations/elevations. By evaluating the function
relating optical slant to geographical slant, one can estimate the implied perceived gaze
direction required to minimize signed error in this function across different gaze directions
(for details, see Li & Durgin, 2009; Durgin & Li, 2011a). In the extreme, estimation of
geographical slant for surfaces that are viewed with direction of gaze nearly parallel to the
judged surface can be interpreted as estimates of gaze direction. The results of these
methods agree with the direct verbal report of perceived gaze declination (Durgin & Li,
2011a).

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

One non-verbal method of assessing perceived direction of gaze is to have participants
adjust the location of a ball until it appears to be in a direction that is halfway between
straight-ahead and straight down. Assessments of this implicit perceived 45° point, show
that it is approximately 30° below horizontal, again implying an angular perceptual gain of
1.5 relative to horizontal (Durgin & Li, 2011a). A second non-verbal method of assessing
perceived gaze declination is simply to compare perceived egocentric distance with
perceived height, as shown in Figure 3. That is, when participants are asked to set
themselves the same distance from a pole as the pole is high (Higashiyama & Ueyama,
1988; Li, Phillips, & Durgin, 2011), the perceived equidistance point corresponds nearly
perfectly to the position predicted if the angular declinations to the top and bottom of the
pole are assumed to be misperceived with a gain of 1.5, as shown in the right panel of Figure
3.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Thus, a variety of explicit and implicit measures of perceived angular declination including
judgments of (1) direction, (2) surface orientation, (3) horizontal/vertical bisection, and (4)
height/distance matching all provide converging evidence that perceived gaze (or angular)
declination is exaggerated with a gain of about 1.5 relative to actual gaze declination.
Although the scaling ambiguity with respect to perceived distance remains intact (perhaps
people exaggerate their eye-height, but accurately perceive ground distance), there does not
seem to be a scaling ambiguity with regard to perceived angular declination. The errors
observed in perceived gaze declination, as shown in Figure 2, imply that perceived distance
is indeed compressed (when expressed in perceived eye-height units). The amount of
compression predicted by the angular expansion of 1.5 is very close to the frequentlyobserved distance underestimation ratio of 0.7.
Although observed verbal estimates of egocentric distance are often less distorted than 0.7,
this improved performance may be largely due to explicit verbal recalibration. As discussed
above, many athletes become distance experts simply by being familiar with specific field
dimensions (e.g., the distance of a penalty kick, the distance to first base). It has recently
been found that elderly adults are fairly accurate at judging distance on grass (Bian &
Andersen, 2013), and this also may be a cognitive result of life experiences. Golfers (and
their caddies) are often particularly expert at estimating distances on grass. But golfers still
misperceive their gaze declination (Durgin & Li, 2011a) and athletes still perform like
others when asked to match egocentric distance to pole height (Durgin et al., 2012). These
facts suggest that the idealized 0.7 ratio of egocentric distance underestimation may
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calibration, whereas the underlying perceptual distortion remains.
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How can action be effective if perception is wrong? The importance of
calibration
The performance of actions with respect to egocentric distance (such as walking) almost
never shows any indication of systematic perceptual error. If perceptual error is both
systematic and stable1, actions will become calibrated to it. Thus, the angular biases we are
discussing, though quite large, are evidently stable and systematic. How can motor
calibration overcome this?

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Consider the studies of Ooi, Wu and He (2001, 2006) showing that actions are calibrated to
angular declination. Ooi et al. used a dual task to illustrate that perceived distance was
controlled by angular declination even in the dark: Participants viewed a glowing object and
were asked to walk to where the object was, but also to then hold their hand at the height of
the object. When this was done, participants walked too short for the actual position of the
ball on the floor. However, their final hand positions were in line with the true direction of
initial gaze, as illustrated in Figure 4A by the gray circles. That is, the error in perceived
location of each ball seemed to be an error along the line of sight. Ooi et al. have regarded
this experiment as a demonstration that perceived angular declination is accurate. But the
same outcome is predicted even if angular declination is not accurately perceived. Panel A
represents the experimenter’s measurement of the situation, but Panel B of Figure 4
illustrates how the situation in Panel A would actually be perceived by the participant,
assuming angular expansion. The participant’s sense of walked distance has been calibrated
to the distortion in their perceived angular declination, so their actions (measured by the
experimenter according to Panel A) are consistent with the perceptual situation as
experienced by the participant (i.e., Panel B).

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

Because both the perceived angle of declination and the perceived walked distance are
distorted in common, the subjectively perceived height and distance of the ball still falls
along the (misperceived) lines of angular declination (Figure 4A). This perceptual situation
predicts the same behavior as occurs in actuality (Figure 4B), showing that the experimental
data from action measures like these do not discriminate between accurate and inaccurate
perception of distance and direction, though they do show the importance of angular
variables in the control of action.
Note that when action measures are interpreted as perceptual matching tasks, they can be
used to demonstrate the differential scaling of egocentric and frontal ground extents. For
example, when pantomime walking (walking obliquely to represent an extent) is used to
assess both perceived egocentric distances and perceived exocentric frontal extents, it
supports the interpretation that calibration of walking to egocentric perception of distance

1The popular view that perception is not stable (e.g., Proffitt, 2006) has been extensively critiqued by our lab and others (Durgin et al.,
2009; Durgin et al., 2010; Durgin, DeWald, Lechich, Li & Ontiveros, 2011; Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawser & Williams, 2012;
Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Shaffer & Flint, 2011; Shaffer, McManama, Swank & Durgin, 2013; Woods, Philbeck &
Danoff, 2009).
Psychol Neurosci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 November 25.
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(i.e., the under-estimation of their own walked distance) makes people walk too far when
trying to walk out a frontal extent (Li et al., 2013).
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Why should perception be systematically wrong? The sensitivity
hypothesis
The argument so far is that there are systematic biases in the perception of locomotor space
and that normal actions are calibrated to this space so the distortions are transparent to
action. But what possible reason could there be for having such a distortion? Accurate
perception is unnecessary for accurate action, so long as the mapping between perception
and action is stable and can be learned. But this does not answer the question of why there is
systematic error in perception. A lack of need for accuracy is an insufficient theoretical
account of why there is a systematic bias. What has recently been proposed as an
explanation is that the bias serves the goals of improving action control by improving action
feedback (Durgin & Li, 2011a).
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The precision of action control can be limited by the perceptual sensitivity available. One’s
actions can be therefore more finely tuned if one’s perceptual feedback is more finely coded
(see Durgin, 2009). Perceptual feedback can be enhanced optically, for example, by the use
of magnification: A watchmaker who uses a magnifying glass to see the small parts he or
she is manipulating is more successful in his or her actions despite the rescaling that the
magnifying glass accomplishes (Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge & Stigliani, 2010; Hajnal,
Abdul-Malak & Durgin, 2011). In the present case, angular expansion is not due to an
optical shift (which would increase visual resolution), but rather a coding choice that is
hypothesized to expand the internal scaling of a crucial angular variable.

NIH-PA Author Manuscript

As the brain transmits information about angular declination from perceptual to motor
systems, it probably has a limited bandwidth channel over which to pass that information
reliably. Indeed, bandwidth limitations may be necessary to maintain error correction
systems responsible for the stable transmission of perceptual variables. Under such
conditions, the limited bandwidth available might cause the system to distribute coding
unevenly by favoring the part of the range used most. This is a compression/coding strategy
that is known as Huffman coding, and it is also consistent with a Bayesian prediction
strategy. The apparent linearity of the distortion in perceived declination suggests a further
constraint on the coding choice.
If actions like walking are governed by neural estimates of angular variables like gaze
declination (or angular declination), then the neural transmission of this variable between
perceptual and motor systems ought to retain maximum differentiation among different
declinations. If the neutrally-implemented coding of this variable is adapted so as to
maximally differentiate among the values most important for evaluating egocentric ground
distance, then the decision to exaggerate differences by a factor of 1.5 may make sense:
Over the range from 0–45°, expansion by this factor will improve the effective coding
precision available for the control of motor action. Not only is gaze rarely directed lower
than about 35° during locomotion (Marigold & Patla, 2006), but past 45°, egocentric
distances along the ground become frontal to gaze (i.e., when gaze is directed downward).
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Thus, relative to normal straight-ahead gaze, expanded coding of angles by 1.5 has no
adverse consequences (whereas expanding by a factor of 3 would be unsuitable). The
advantage gained by this coding scheme would be to retain greater coding resolution over a
smaller range (smaller than 0–90°) in the coding of perceived declination.

Conclusions
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Evidence from the distortion of angular variables helps to corroborate the idea that, relative
to perceived eye-height, the perception of egocentric distance is systematically compressed.
Because angular variables are inherently encoded on a scale that is non-arbitrary and
bounded at both ends (i.e., the linear range between horizontal and vertical), the converging
evidence for systematic biases in perceived angular declination means that it is appropriate
to speak of the mis-scaling of perceived distance with greater confidence. Note that this
angular theory is unrelated to prior descriptions of correlations between perceived extent and
visual angles (Kudoh, 2005; Levin & Haber, 1993), but it provides a new interpretation of
the findings of Higashiyama (1996). The main conclusion to be drawn from this review is
that there are clearly systematic biases in the human perceptual coding of locomotor space
as revealed by multiple methodologies designed to examine perceived angular declination.
Because actions are calibrated to perceptual experience, the use of action measures allows
one to draw only limited conclusions about perceptual scaling. Perceptual matching tasks
strongly support the idea that angular variables relevant to evaluating egocentric distance are
coded on an expanded scale. This expanded scaling is sufficient to account for a great deal
of historical data suggesting that egocentric ground distance is perceptually underestimated
and that the perceptual scaling of both vertical and horizontal frontal extents differ from the
scaling of egocentric extents in depth along the ground.
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Figure 1.

Panel A depicts the top view of a person who translates along the bold line past a target
(dark circle) to his or her right. The dashed lines show the reported direction and distance to
the target before and after translation. This apparent failure of triangulation when oblique
blind walking is combined with verbally estimated target distance (Loomis & Philbeck,
2008) is shown in Panel A. But Panel B shows that subjective triangulation was actually
successful so long as the perception of walked distance (dashed bold line) is also
underestimated, as is to be expected if visual egocentric distance is underperceived.
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Figure 2.

The angular expansion theory of distance underestimation. Angular (or gaze) declination (γ),
depicted here as the line from the head to the cone on the ground in side view, is a distance
cue. If perceived angular declination (the dashed line) relative to straight ahead (the dotted
line) is greater than the actual angular declination, then the perceived egocentric ground
distance will be reduced accordingly.
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Figure 3.
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When asked to match their egocentric distance from a pole to the height of a pole (left),
people set themselves much too far away, consistent with the underestimation of egocentric
distance. The matched position across multiple experiments (shown at right) can be
predicted by a model (the solid line in the graph) that assumes perceived angular deviations
from the horizontal are exaggerated with a gain of 1.5. The model has no free parameters,
but it can be used to predict both perceived egocentric distance (as shown in Figure 2) and
perceived height (i.e. by also expanding the angle above eye-level) by simple trigonometry
(Li et al., 2011).
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Figure 4.
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Panel A depicts that, in the dark, people act as if objects on the floor (black circles) are
actually hovering in the air (gray circles). Their actions (walking and then reaching down to
the perceived location) are consistent with the correct perception of the direction of their
gaze from the starting position (Ooi, Wu & He, 2001, 2006). But the actions of such a
person are also consistent with the concurrent misperception of both direction and distance
illustrated in Panel B. The lifelong calibration of perceived walked distance to perceived
visual distance is sufficient to make actual action effective (along the line of sight, as in
panel A) even though the actor’s perception of the situation -- including their amount of self
motion -- remains distorted (as in Panel B).
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